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MEDIATION—ITS POTENTIAL AND ITS 
LIMITS: DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE 
DISCOURSE ON THE RESEARCH AND 
PRACTICE OF PEACEMAKING 
Dennis C. Jett* 
The articles in this issue of the Penn State Journal of Law & 
International Affairs summarize analytic research relevant to conflict 
situations and offer recommendations for how conflicts can more 
effectively be brought to an end. It is therefore worth considering 
how policymakers might employ these recommendations as they 
pursue the often elusive goal of peace. 
THE “POLICYMAKER” DEFINED 
One difficulty with that task is that “policymaker” is a title 
that can be applied to many different people playing many different 
roles in a conflict situation. The policymakers within a national 
government will be comprised of politicians elected to office, officials 
appointed by those politicians, and career bureaucrats. Each of them 
will approach the problem with different perspectives and priorities 
though they are nominally on the same team. 
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Policymakers can come from the governments that are party 
to the conflict, neighboring states, regional and global powers, and 
any other nation that believes it has a dog in a particular fight. 
In a civil war, in addition to the policymakers of the regime in 
power, there are those who have some degree of control over the 
group or groups trying to overthrow that regime in order to take 
power themselves. In any country in conflict, there are also the 
noncombatants who make up the elements of civil society that are 
trying to bring it to an end. They may not make policy, but the 
decisions they do make can place pressure on the combatants and 
help the cause of peace. 
And then there are international organizations, where the 
representatives of member states provide instructions to international 
civil servants on how those organizations are to be involved. Even 
with clear guidance, there is much policy to be made in implementing 
a mandate including how to interpret it in the field and how 
forcefully to pursue it. Whether any of that can be done competently 
with the resources made available to these organizations by their 
members is another question. 
That does not exhaust the list of players of course. 
Nongovernmental organizations are often instrumental in peace 
accords, once they are reached, as they can have the capacity to 
implement programs that bring into being many of the elements of 
such accords. 
When the official representatives of the governments and 
rebel groups that are parties to the conflict fail to end it, a potential 
role for a mediator is created. Representatives of many of the 
organizations can attempt to serve in that capacity along with 
virtually anyone else who wants to engage in what is known as Track 
II diplomacy.1 The only real requirement is that the parties to the 
conflict accept them as mediators. There is usually no shortage of 
elder statesmen and retired politicians willing to serve as mediators, 
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especially if visions of a Nobel Peace Prize nomination are dancing in 
their heads. 
Even though all will agree that peace is the goal, each 
policymaker will approach it from his or her perspective and be 
encumbered by some limitations, which affect just how much policy 
they are willing and able to make. With so many potential players, and 
so many violent conflicts, it is therefore important to consider to 
whom the policy recommendations are being made and what 
constraints they may be operating under. It is with that preliminary 
consideration in mind that I offer an evaluation as to whether the 
recommendations contained in this journal issue are realistic and 
useful. 
MEDIATION RESEARCH IN PRACTICE 
A.  Scott Sigmund Gartner, Deceptive Results: Why Mediation Appears to 
Fail but Actually Succeeds2 
Improving mediation is important, but even the best 
mediation is not a silver bullet solution. Wars can end in one of four 
ways—through a military victory, when a halt to the fighting is 
imposed by outside powers, when the parties to the conflict negotiate 
a cessation of hostilities in good faith, and when they negotiate one in 
bad faith. 
When one side wins outright, there is no need for mediation. 
A clear military victory is difficult in a civil war, however, as it usually 
pits a government with a weak army against rebel forces that are even 
weaker. Both sides will have the power to terrorize civilians, but 
rarely enough to defeat each other. 
When the international community steps in and forces an end 
to the conflict, it does not remove the underlying reasons for why the 
war started in the first place. That can imply a long-term commitment 
to creating a solution and that, plus a general reluctance to use force 
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to end the use of force, means there is rarely any enthusiasm for that 
outcome among other countries. 
A negotiated end to conflict can often involve and be 
facilitated by mediation. But as Scott Sigmund Gartner points out in 
his article, success is not as elusive as it seems because the conflicts in 
which mediators are involved are also the ones least likely to succeed. 
If a peace accord were easy, the parties could reach it themselves. 
This point is worth remembering, and the international community 
and potential mediators should not avoid making the effort simply 
because the chances for success are not good.  While mediation can 
be costly in many ways, they pale in comparison to the likely costs of 
continued war. The parties to the conflict will measure the cost of 
mediation as the potential it has for diminishing their chances to 
obtain more power, often without much regard for the toll on 
noncombatants should the war continue. Human suffering aside, the 
costs of relief efforts for refugees and people displaced by the 
fighting can easily and quickly amount to hundreds of millions of 
dollars. 
The need for local expertise is one of the reasons that 
regional governmental organizations, with close ties, in-depth 
knowledge, and shared regional identities, are becoming increasingly 
utilized as mediators.3 On the other hand, while the countries in the 
region are the ones most directly affected by the spillover when a 
conflict’s impact starts to cross borders, they may not be the best 
choice. 
Regional organizations are often given the task of dealing 
with a conflict because the wider international community wants to 
avoid getting further involved rather than because they make ideal 
mediators. There is a strong correlation between conflict and poverty; 
civil wars occur more frequently in the least developed countries. The 
neighbors of countries in conflict are also likely to be poor and 
therefore the least able to support the cost of mediation and 
intervention. The neighboring states may also profit from the chaos 
by exploiting the resources of the country at war. And they will likely 
have an opinion as to which side they would like to see win. This may 
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be due to ethnic linkages, which can serve to make the conflict more 
difficult to resolve. So the decision to rely on a regional organization 
should be considered carefully and not assumed to be the best 
outcome. 
B.  Kyle Beardsley, Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator 
     Leverage and Conflict Resolution4 
Kyle Beardsley’s discussion of the use of leverage by 
mediators in attempting to end conflicts is a useful reminder that 
mediators can try to use too much leverage as well as too little 
leverage. Using too little will not resolve the conflict and using too 
much might only result in a short-term cessation of hostilities and not 
address the root causes of the conflict. 
By using just the right amount of leverage, the mediator can 
in theory achieve an end to the bloodshed and the humanitarian 
disaster it has caused and, at the same time, set the stage for a lasting 
peace.  That is easier said than done, however, and it seems to 
assume mediators have a range of tools to use and the ability and 
willingness to use them. That is rarely the case. 
Mediators are almost always in an inherently weak position.5 
Their role has to be accepted by the parties to the conflict and those 
parties do not see such efforts as an opportunity to negotiate their 
own demise. They will limit what the mediator can accomplish and 
choose a mediator precisely because that person is weak. They are 
generally unwilling to concede much power to the mediator and will 
resist any efforts to force them to do things that they calculate are 
not in their interests. Thus, it is hard to identify too much or too little 
leverage ex ante facto, before its use, although the appropriate degree 
of leverage might be more clear ex post facto, after the mediation. 
A mediator can have significant leverage if there is a 
willingness on the part of the international community to use military 
force or economic pressure to end a particular conflict. In his choice 
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of examples, Beardsley mentions the recent case of Syria where, as he 
notes, Russia and China have blocked any U.N. Security Council 
resolutions that might have teeth. Given the absence of any real 
leverage, Kofi Annan’s efforts at mediation were doomed from the 
start. Since the Assad regime was not about to negotiate its own 
removal from power and is indifferent to the number of civilians 
killed, the only tool in Annan’s toolbox was his ability to persuade 
both sides to stop fighting, and that obviously proved insufficient. 
Beardsley uses the case of Rwanda as one where mediators 
used too much leverage He believes this only resulted in a short-term 
cessation of hostilities, which was then followed by genocide after 
they resumed. A lower level of leverage implies less international 
involvement. It seems unlikely that would have made the outcome 
better and resulted in fewer deaths. In retrospect, most have 
concluded that a much more forceful intervention by the 
international community was required instead of an attempt at 
mediation that was too weak to prevent mass murder. 
The problem for any mediator, and the international 
community as a whole, is that it is never clear whether hostilities are 
going to get worse or better. Even when there is some indication 
which direction the conflict is headed, unforeseen events—like the 
shooting down of the plane carrying Rwandan President 
Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart—can be a catalyst for 
catastrophe. Habyarimana, had he lived, might have successfully 
implemented the Arusha accords. 
The international reaction to conflict situations is often based 
on hope and the desire to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The 
biggest problem in Rwanda, as Beardsley points out, was the 
international community followed up the signing of the peace 
accords with a tiny peacekeeping force and a weak mandate that only 
allowed them to become bystanders, and at times victims, when the 
violence resumed. 
The role of Richard Holbrooke in ending the war in Bosnia is 
cited by Beardsley as a compelling case in which the use of leverage 
calmed a humanitarian disaster. Holbrooke had a very forceful 
personality, however, and the military might of NATO to draw upon 
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if he chose to use it. There is no greater source of leverage than the 
ability to use force to punish an uncooperative party. 
Having that power at the ready is not going to typically be the 
case. The international community is rarely willing to use such force. 
The fighting in Libya ended because the international community was 
willing to use such force in that instance. The fighting in Syria 
continues, however, because the international community is not 
willing to use force, at least not as of the time this is being written. 
Another problem is that some mediators are life-long U.N. 
bureaucrats. One of the unwritten rules for a successful career at the 
U.N. seems to be “never alienate anyone.” With 193 member states 
as their bosses, those that work at the U.N. do not like to stick their 
necks out. A U.N. mediator therefore may not be enthusiastic about 
using leverage since it is bound to displease someone. Even 
mediators who are not U.N. officials are unlikely to have as strong a 
personality type as Holbrooke. 
Beardsley’s fundamental point, however, is important for any 
mediator to consider. It is always essential to look into the toolbox 
and see what instruments of leverage it contains. Unfortunately, in 
many real world instances, there may not be much in the toolbox and 
the mediator may not be able or willing to use the tools available. 
Given Beardsley’s argument, additional research might examine how 
to expand the options available to mediators. 
C.  Molly M. Melin, When States Mediate6 
In her essay on when states mediate, Molly Melin concludes 
that states should offer to mediate “only in optimal circumstances” 
and policymakers should “first consider the characteristics of the 
third party, the conflict, and the disputants.” Both recommendations 
may seem obvious but are they easily achieved? 
States seek to act as mediators when their interests are at 
stake or when they feel they have to become involved. A 
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humanitarian crisis can create pressure for international action as it 
did for Bosnia and Darfur even when the national interests of the 
major powers are not directly threatened. If the suffering largely 
escapes the media’s attention and the public’s concern, as it has in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, the pressure and the resulting 
action will be much less however. 
Another reason states want to mediate is prestige. When a 
conflict is somehow identified with a potential mediator, because of 
colonial ties or other linkages, there will again be pressure, often from 
the public and the media, to play such a role. Having an interest in a 
conflict implies the mediator is not indifferent to the outcome, 
however, and that can lessen the acceptability of the mediator to the 
parties to the dispute. As Melin points out, in cases where the 
decision to attempt to mediate stems from domestic politics, public 
pressure, national interests, or politicians’ search for prestige, the 
decision to get involved may have little to do with whether the 
situation is optimal for mediation. 
If the conditions are not optimal, but the pressure to do 
something to end the conflict is significant, states will often look for 
non-state actors like international organizations or prominent former 
statesmen willing to play the role.  That way any blame for failure, 
when it comes, can be shifted to the mediator and the damage to 
national pride and political risk can be minimized. 
As Melin points out, nation states are the most frequent 
mediators of international disputes.  Thus it is critical to understand 
the factors affecting their involvement. As she suggests, it is the 
parties involved in a conflict that decide whether there is to be a 
mediator and they will do that only when they think it serves their 
interests. The problem is that the disputants may not reach the stage 
until what I. William Zartman has characterized as a “hurting 
stalemate”7 has been achieved.  The combatants will then see further 
military efforts as impossible or unproductive. Arriving at that point 
may take years and is why there are more conflicts every year than 
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there are mediation efforts and not because states considering 
becoming mediators are pondering their strategic choices. 
D.  Stephen E. Gent, The Politics of International Arbitration and 
Adjudication8 
 
Wars come in two flavors—the international kind where the 
opposing sides are nation states (interstate conflicts), and internal 
ones, where the regime in power is pitted against those who seek to 
overthrow it (intrastate conflicts). Wars between countries are usually 
over territory, though there are usually other factors involved as well. 
Wars within countries are almost always about political power. In the 
former, if the parties are willing to accept the outcome, those 
imaginary lines on maps called borders can easily be drawn to divide 
territory. Resolving the latter type of conflict is harder, however, 
because political power is not as easily divided, especially in a poor 
country where elites are either in power or out of luck. When a 
faction does take control of the government, even through legitimate 
elections, the majority tends to rule with little regard for the rights of 
minorities. And there is no Heritage Foundation or American 
Enterprise Institute where ideologues can hang out until their side 
can return to power. 
The difference between interstate wars over territory and 
intrastate wars over political power also has implications for 
alternatives to mediation. As Gent points out in his essay, 
international arbitration and adjudication is often the most effective 
means of producing long-lasting settlements and certainly should be 
considered as an alternative means of dispute resolution. 
Such a binding mechanism, however, is unlikely to be used 
when the challenge is dividing political power in a country where that 
has never been achieved before. Dividing territory is something 
international arbitrators are good at because there is usually some 
legal basis on which to proceed, but it does not always end the 
problem. Having an international body mandate a solution provides 
cover to political elites who have to defend against charges that they 
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have given up too much. Even that may not be enough to ease the 
pain of wounded national pride, as Gent demonstrates in his 
description of how Ethiopia rejected an international boundary 
commission’s demarcation of its frontier with Eritrea. 
Gent also points out that the losing side in the finding of an 
arbitration panel is more likely to reject the decision if it possesses a 
clear power advantage. That means either other, more flexible 
mechanisms should be considered as he suggests, or at a minimum, 
the international community needs to throw its weight behind 
supporting the outcome and provide incentives for both sides to 
respect it. One advantage of having elections as part of the process 
that brings a civil war to end is that it confers legitimacy on the 
winner. The loser will have an easy excuse for rejecting the result if 
the winner is chosen by an international arbitrator and not by the 
voters. To avoid that tendency, the international community must use 
the carrots and sticks at its disposal to ensure the outcome is 
accepted if the parties agree to arbitration. 
Interestingly, international arbitration has increasingly 
become the rule in international commercial disputes. While its use is 
growing in non-commercial international disputes, it is still not 
common. So while policymakers should certainly look carefully at all 
aspects of the conflict—including who should mediate and when—
decisions are often made not on the basis of an objective and 
detached assessment of what can be achieved.  Rather decisions are 
made on the basis of what is necessary and what is possible given the 
political pressures they are operating under.  In order for 
international arbitration to expand from economic to political 
disputes actors will have to address these types of political pressures. 
E.  Isak Svensson, Research on Bias in Mediation: Policy Implications9 
Isak Svensson discusses the policy implications of bias in 
mediators and concludes that even biased ones can play a useful role. 
He notes that rebel-biased mediators tend to create peace settlements 
that include power-sharing arrangements while government-biased 
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mediators opt for amnesties. Both the mediators and the outcomes 
that are deemed acceptable are up to the parties in the conflict. The 
bias in play may therefore result from the selection process rather 
than a preference toward a particular solution on the part of the 
mediator. Mediators “create” only those solutions that the 
combatants will agree to and are able to consider solutions that might 
be accepted by both sides. 
Svensson’s central premise—that bias is not an inherent 
disqualifying feature of mediation—is an important one. However, 
and as Svensson points out, a little bias may not be a bad thing. The 
real test is whether the mediator is capable of guiding the parties to 
an agreement and not whether he or she is absolutely neutral.  This 
also represents a major distinction between domestic mediation—
which seeks neutrality among mediators—and international 
mediation. For example, it not only took Begin and Sadat to create 
peace between Israel and Egypt but it also took Carter, the leader of a 
pro-Israel state, to convince Israel to give up territory in exchange for 
a U.S. assurance of security. Mediators will often be charged with 
bias, especially by the side playing the weaker hand, whether it exists 
or not. The parties to the conflict have to have some sense that the 
mediator will act fairly even if not necessarily impartially. The bias 
may even help get the stronger side to a deal as it probably did at 
Camp David. 
F.  Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic Peacemaking10 
Birger Heldt, of the Folke Bernadotte Academy, examines the 
growth in the number of efforts at peacemaking in emerging conflicts 
and in particular the lack of coordination that results from so many 
different actors becoming involved. To address this problem, he 
suggests policymakers adopt a long-term strategy focused on 
coordination. In addition, he urges policymakers not to be 
discouraged by the failures of initial peacemaking attempts. He 
cautions that the need for coordination should not crowd out 
attempts at further peacemaking. He also emphasizes that if violence 
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is going to escalate dramatically, it normally does so in the first two 
years of the conflict. 
That two-year window when effective peacemaking has a 
chance to prevent a significant expansion of hostilities is critical for 
policymakers to acknowledge and incorporate into planning efforts. 
The problem, of course, is that senior officials in any busy capitol or 
international body are almost always consumed by the crisis of the 
moment and long-term planning rarely gets beyond next week. The 
paradox and the tragedy is that until the violence does escalate, the 
conflict is likely to fail to grab the attention of the media and the 
policymakers. 
The International Crisis Group and other organizations have 
long tried to direct the attention of officials to crises in need of 
attention and alert policymakers before the conflicts escalate. The 
U.N. has discussed ways to improve crisis management and to take 
advantage of constantly evolving information and communications 
technology.11 It would be useful if each government and international 
organization had an internal group that was designed to prioritize 
mediation needs. And those groups should try and stay ahead of the 
curve by engaging in a continuing dialogue with those who make the 
study of mediation efforts their academic specialty. 
The coordination of peacemaking efforts is made difficult by 
the fact that there are no barriers to entry, especially to potential 
Track II mediators. That may account for the growth in such efforts 
as much as any other factor. It is still worthwhile to attempt to bring 
coordination, as well as long-term planning, to peacemaking. The 
biggest obstacle is perhaps a lack of time and attention to the 
problem by policymakers as much as anything else. Heldt’s policy 
recommendations offer an important reminder of the value of 
preventative measures and of the critical timeframe for such action. 
  
                                                 
11 See generally Daniel Stauffacher, Strengthening Crisis Information 
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G.  Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An 
Organizational Perspective12 
Victor Asal and Jonathan Wilkenfeld provide a convincing 
argument that assumptions about a conflict always need to be 
checked and that generalizations expounded by scholars and 
journalists can lead to the wrong policy choices. True experts in a 
region need to convey the complexity of each situation to 
policymakers without making it seem so difficult that any 
involvement is unwise. Academics and other analysts need to keep in 
mind that no data set can substitute for in-depth knowledge when it 
comes to a particular conflict. Some humility is required in making 
assessments of conflicts and policy recommendations regarding 
them. If they are made simply on the basis of number crunching of 
past conflicts, ideology or a lack of knowledge about the motivations 
of the combatants, an illusion of understanding will be created and 
could lead to poor decisions.13 
H.  David E. Cunningham, Who Should Be at the Table?: Veto Players and 
Peace Processes in Civil War14 
David Cunningham cautions that too many players can spoil 
the peace process and urges that those without a veto be excluded 
from it. It will not be only the mediator that decides who gets a seat 
at the table, but to the extent that this recommendation can be 
followed, it should be. While civil society may not participate in the 
actual negotiations, it would also be useful to think of ways to help 
them pressure the parties to come to an agreement. Leymah Gbowee, 
the Liberian activist who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is one example 
of how such pressure can be used to encourage politicians to 
negotiate seriously. 
                                                 
12 Victor Asal & Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Ethnic Conflict: An Organizational 
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analysis and the U.S. Institute of Peace should be embarrassed by its publication. 
See RICHARD SYNGE, MOZAMBIQUE: UN PEACEKEEPING IN ACTION, 1992-94 
(1997).  
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Cunningham notes the problem with a strategy of threatening 
to exclude the main combatants from the negotiations is not 
effective. If they are not included there are no benefits from peace, 
because peace won’t be possible. The parties must always reach a 
decision that their interests are better served by peace than by 
continued war for any talks to begin. And there must be some 
common ground that is reachable, which it is not when the aims of 
those doing the fighting are diametrically opposed and nonnegotiable. 
I.  J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature 
on  the Failure of Mediation15 
J. Michael Greig is the co-author of one of the most 
comprehensive books on international mediation.16  Here, Greig 
applies his strong analytical understanding of mediation not to one 
issue, but to one case.  In his assessment of Syria, he quotes one 
Middle Eastern analyst as saying that President Assad will go down 
fighting. If that is the case, there is little that can be done by the 
international community. If active military engagement is ruled out, 
the international community can do little more than encourage 
opposition forces to discuss and coordinate what will happen after 
the fighting stops. Efforts have been made and conferences held to 
try to avoid the post-conflict chaos that has been seen in Libya. It is 
unfortunate that more was not done to help Libya make the difficult 
transition from dictatorship to democracy, but it is hard to anticipate 
if and when regime change is going succeed and therefore hard for 
the international community to know what to do and the best timing 
for doing it. And if, as in the case of Syria, those in power have 
strong allies like Russia and Iran encouraging them to fight on, a 
mediator will have little chance of success as Kofi Annan finally 
admitted. Whether his successor, Lakhdar Brahimi, will do any better 
will depend on circumstances beyond his control more than his 
ability to mediate. 
                                                 
15 J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on 
the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN ST. J.L. & INT’L AFF. 48 (2013). 
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(2012). 
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CONCLUSIONS - MEDIATORS AND THE REALITIES THEY FACE 
Mediators almost always play a weak hand unless, like 
Richard Holbrooke in the case of Bosnia, they represent an entity 
that is willing to take an active part in the conflict. Whether dealt a 
weak hand or a strong one, mediators play a crucial role in reaching a 
peaceful resolution to a conflict and have a significant effect on the 
durability of the settlement that ends the fighting. Mediators do not 
simply add “grease” to the “squeaky wheel” but can redefine issues, 
reshape debates, and restructure negotiations in ways that lead to 
successful and peaceful outcomes.  It is therefore important that 
mediators carry out their responsibilities with the utmost skill and 
access to the relevant research, as that will enhance the chances for 
success. 
At the same time, mediation often occurs in a crises situation 
where it is virtually impossible to reach out and learn about past 
patterns, new theories and innovative approaches. In that regard it is 
useful for policymakers, to draw on the cumulative knowledge of 
mediation scholars, both represented here and throughout the 
research community before they get to the work of mediating. Even 
if such general learning is not possible, whatever their relationship to 
the situation and their power to affect it, mediators and policymakers 
should consider the research-based recommendations outlined in this 
collection of essays. 
The journal’s goal in constructing this issue—to develop a 
more robust and interactive dialogue between researchers and 
practitioners—should be received as a call to the members of both 
communities. It is important for researchers, who have the time to 
study these matters in depth without being forced to rapidly turn 
their attention to the next crisis, to share their findings on what 
works and what does not with more than other academics. And those 
who have served as mediators need to share with researchers their 
views on the constraints they face in the field. There are a number of 
ways to accomplish this kind of direct dialogue on peacemaking, 
which will draw the communities together and produce mutually 
beneficial results—and this issue serves as an important launch point 
to begin that discussion. 
